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PIAC (PEE IN A CUP)- THE NEW STANDARDIZED
TEST FOR STUDENT-ATHLETES
If you are a student-athlete in the United States, the SAT 1
might not be the only standardized test you take this spring.
Throughout the country, public school student-athletes are also
subject to random drug testing programs, even in the absence
of actual suspicions. Despite United States Supreme Court
precedent in Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton 2 allowing
drug testing of students participating in extracurricular
activities, parents and students continue to challenge the
constitutionality of drug testing. This paper examines cases
and constitutional challenges to student-athlete drug testing
programs since the Supreme Court's decision in Vernonia. 3 It
considers cases influencing the court decisions, and examines
the analysis used by the courts in these cases determining the
constitutionality of drug testing in schools.
I. I'M POPULAR, I'M HIP. OF COURSE I'VE USED

DRUGS~

In 2007, a news story reported that students who
considered themselves popular were more likely to use drugs,
drink, or smoke, than their peers who did not view themselves
as popular. 4 Very often, student-athletes are considered some
of the most popular students in high school. This fact alone
should cause concern among casual readers as well as school
officials regarding the potentially prevalent use of drugs by the
average high school student-athlete.
The controversy surrounding drug use permeates the
professional sports field today, 5 but this concern is not limited
1. Scholastic Achievement Test.
2. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 4 7J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
3. !d.
4. Study: Teen Drug Use at Schools Worsens, NEWSMAJC.COM, Aug. 16, 2007,
http://archive. newsmax.com/archi ves/ic/2007 /8/16/111443. shtml.
5. Watching ESPN's Sports Center during the months of January and February
2009, a viewer is bombarded with stories about steroid use among professional baseball
players. See Mike Wise, One Name is Not Enough in this Case, WASH. POST, Feb. 10,
2009, at EOl.
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to the professional arena. In 1993, more than 250,000
adolescents admitted to steroid use. 6 Later, in 1999 the
American Medical Association reported that 2% of high school
students admitted using steroids. That percentage rose to 4%
in 2002 and 6%) in 2003.7 Today, that percentage realistically is
even higher as more than 50%) of high school students admit to
having tried an illicit drug of some sort, and three out of ten
have used a drug other than marijuana by the end of high
school. 8 Of particular concern is the rise in use of anabolic
steroids, tranquilizers, and barbiturates by students, along
with the dramatic rise in illegal, non-medical use of Oxycontin
and Vicodin. 9
To combat the drug problem among students, many schools
have initiated random drug testing programs aimed at
students, and more specifically at student-athletes. In fact,
according to a nationwide study published in the May 2008
American Journal of Public Health, one in seven public school
districts randomly drug test their students, up· nearly 50% from
five years earlier. 10 By randomly singling out some of the most
visible
and
popular
students-student-athletes-these
programs are designed to catch and punish offenders, as well
as to deter general drug use. Despite growing prevalence of
drug testing, nonetheless, the American Academy of Pediatrics
warns that school-based drug testing may "decrease student
involvement in extracurricular activities and undermine trust

6. Eugene C. Bjorklun, Drug Testing High School Athletes and the Fourth
Amendment, 83 EDUC. L. REP. 913, 914 (1993).
7. Christopher Lawlor, New Jersey Institutes Statewide Steroid- Testing for High
School
Athletes,
USA
TODAY,
June
15,
2006,
http://www. usatoday.com/sports/preps/2006-06-07- nj-steroid-testing_x. htm;
Cynthia
Sysol, Constitutional and Indispensable Legislation: Mandatory Random Steroid
Testing for High School Athletes, 37 J.L. & EDUC. 597, 597 (Oct. 2008).
8. Joseph R. McKinney, The Effectiveness and Legality of Random Student Drug
Testing Policies, 184 EDUC. L. REP. 669, 669 (2004).
9. Id.; see also U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Servs., Monitoring the Future
Survey Shows Decrease in Use of Marijuana, Club Drugs, Cigarettes and Tobacco, Dec.
2002, http://www.nida.nih.gov/Newsroom/02/NR12-16.html; U.S. Dep't of Health and
Human Servs., Monitoring the Future Survey Shows Continued Decline in Drug Use by
Students, Dec. 2005, http://www.nida.nih.gov/newsroom/05/NR12-19a.html; see also
Charles Feeney Knapp, Drug Testing and the Student-Athlete: Meeting the
Constitutional Challenge, 76 IOWA L. REV. 107, 107-08 (Oct. 1990) (comprehensively
explaining that drug use by athletes has a greater probability of reaching epidemic
proportions than non-athletic drug abuse).
10. KEVIN ZEESE, DRUG TESTING LEGAL MANUAL, § 8:4 (West 2d ed. 2008).
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between pupils and educators." 11 Additionally, physicians warn
that there is little evidence of the effectiveness of these types of
drug testing regimes. 12

II. STUDENT RIGHTS AGAINST SEARCHES IN SCHOOL: A PRIMER
Students do not have full constitutional rights while at
school, but they are not stripped of all of their rights, either. So
where on this spectrum of rights do students fall? In the past
the United States Supreme Court observed, "[i]t can hardly be
argued that either students or teachers shed their
constitutional rights. . . at the schoolhouse gate." 13 More
recently, however, the Court state,
Traditionally at common law, and still today, unemancipated
minors lack some of the most fundamental rights of selfdetermination--including even the right of liberty in its
narrow sense, i.e., the right to come and go at will. They are
subject, even as to their physical freedom, to the control of
their parents or guardians. . . When parents place minor
children in private schools for their education, the teachers
and administrators of those schools stand in loco parentis
over the children entrusted to them. In fact, the tutor or
schoolmaster is the very prototype of that status. 14

A. Constitutional Protections Against Unreasonable Search and
Seizure
Searches by public school officials, such as the collection of
urine samples, implicate constitutional interests and
protections. While there are possible Fourteenth Amendment
considerations concerning due process,
the primary
constitutional concern centers on the Fourth Amendment
considerations. 15 The Fourth Amendment of the United States
Constitution protects "[t]he right of the people to be secure in

11. Id.
12. Id.; see also Robert Taylor, Compensating Behavior and the Drug Testing of
High School Athletes, 16 THE CATO J. 351, 351-52 (Winter 1997), available at
http://www.cato.org/pubs/journallcj 16n3-5.html (providing an example of an empirical
study regarding the effectiveness of drug testing).
13. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
14. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 654·55 (1995).
15. BjorkJun, supra note 6, at 915.
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their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures ..... " 16
Application of the Fourth Amendment search and seizure
protection to the public school setting has a history beyond the
immediate realm of drug testing. New Jersey u. T.L.O., sets the
standard for searches of students and student property in
schools. 17 In T.L. 0. the Supreme Court upheld the school
official's physical search of a student and her possessions,
where the official incidentally discovered marijuana, because
the school had a "reasonable suspicion" that the student had
been smoking at school. 18 The current law for school searches
of students and student property calls for school personnel to
perform searches
upon "reasonable," 19 "individualized
suspicion;" 20 the search must be both justified at inception, 21
and reasonable in scope. 22

B. Drug Testing in the Courts, pre- Vernonia School District 47J
u. Acton
One of the earliest cases, occurring in the 1980s, dealt with
the legality of the National Collegiate Athletic Association
(NCAA) drug testing college athletes. 23 In this case the
Supreme Court found no Fourth Amendment implications
because it viewed the NCAA as a private party, at odds with
the state, and therefore not a state actor. 24 This precedent does
little to shed light on the drug testing situation in public
schools because a public school district is clearly not a private
party, but rather a state actor obligated to act within Fourth
Amendment restrictions. In another 1980s case the Supreme
16. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
17. N.J. v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
18. ld. at 347-48.
19. Phaneuf v. Fraikin, 448 F.3d 591, 600 (2d Cir. 2006) (overruling a district
court decision permitting a strip search based on facts, reports, and observations, but
finding that reasonable belief is less than probable cause).
20. DesRoches v. Caprio, 156 F.3d 571, 574 (4th Cir. 1998) (recognizing that to
avoid sweeping searches reasonable suspicion should exist, however, this does not
apply in random searches).
21. That is, did reasonable and individualized suspicion exist to warrant the
search at the time the search began?
22. Based on the reasonable suspicion and inception of the search was the search
reasonable for what the administrator was searching for? Did it fit the need?
23. Nat'! Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179 (1988).
24. ld. at 196.

-------------------~--
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Court considered drug testing in the employment context. The
Court stated, "Because it is clear that the collection and testing
of urine intrudes upon expectations of privacy that society has
long recognized as reasonable . . . these intrusions must be
deemed searches under the Fourth Amendment." 25
In T.L.O., the landmark school search and seizure case, the
Supreme Court observed in a footnote, "[A]lthough 'some
quantum of individualized suspicion is usually a prerequisite to
a constitutional search or seizure[,] ... the Fourth Amendment
imposes no irreducible requirement of such suspicion."' 26 It
seems reasonably clear that under T.L. 0. and other student
search cases that searches of individual students for drugs,
based on reasonable suspicion, would most likely be justified. 27
Even after understanding the law regarding searches in
schools generally, other questions remain. For example, may
schools indiscriminately and randomly test all students for
drugs? Lower courts originally reviewed early drug testing
policies in schools. In Odenheim v. Carlstadt-East Rutherford
Regional School District, a New Jersey court struck down a
school policy requiring all students to consent and submit to
urinalysis as a condition of enrollment. 28 This was followed by
Brooks v. East Chambers Consolidated Independent School
District, a case in which a Texas court struck down a policy
reqmrmg drug testing for all students enrolled in
extracurricular activities, due to lack of evidence that drugs
and drug abuse were problems. 29

C. Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton, Establishing the
Constitutionality of Random Drug Testing of Students
In 1995, the Supreme Court of the United States granted
certiorari to decide whether a school district's random
25. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 617 (1989).
26. N.J. v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 342 n.8 (1985) (citing United States v. MartinezFuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 560-61 (1976)).
27. See Nancy J. Fiatt-Moore, Public Schools and Urinalysis: Assessing the
Validity of Indiana Public Schools' Student Drug Testing Policies After Vernonia, 1998
BYU EDUC. & L.J. 239, (discussing student rights in school, and the early search
cases).
28. Odenheim v. Carlstadt-East Rutherford Reg'! Sch. Dist., 510 A.2d 709, 711-13
(N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1985).
29. Brooks v. E. Chambers Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist., 730 F. Supp. 759, 766 (S.D.
Tex. 1989), aff'd, 930 F.2d 915 (5th Cir. 1991).
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urinalysis drug testing of student-athletes violated the Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendments. 30 The district court had
dismissed the student's complaint, yet the Ninth Circuit
reversed and held that the policy was unconstitutional. 31 In a
six to three decision, the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth
Circuit and found the policy constitutional. 32 The Court
balanced the intrusion on the student's Fourth Amendment
interests against the school district's legitimate interests in
preventing drug use and reasoned that this narrowly directed
policy was permissible. 33
In Vernonia, a logging community in Oregon, school sports
play a prominent role. 34 In the 1980s, drug use increased, and
"athletes were the leaders of the drug culture." 35 This rise in
drug use caused countless problems, including: increases in the
number of disciplinary referrals and suspensions, 36 severe
sports-related injuries, 37 as well as overlooked safety
precautions at sporting events. 38 To combat drug use, the
district added educational courses on drugs and drug use and
used drug-sniffing dogs on campus, but by then the problems
had reached "epidemic proportions." 39
The policy implemented by the school district in Vernonia
required all student-athletes and their parents to sign a release
form granting consent for the testing of the student-athlete. 40
All students were tested at the beginning of their sport's
season. Throughout the season, 10% of the athletes were
selected randomly for testing each week. 41 The urine samples
were collected individually from each student and monitored by
a same gendered adult in the student locker room. 42 The school
sent samples to an independent lab and tested for presence of

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 648 (1995).
/d. at 652.
/d. (O'Connor dissenting, joined by Stevens and Souter).
!d. at 646.
/d. at 648.
!d. at 649.
!d. at 648.
!d. at 649.

/d.
Id.

!d. at 650.
!d.
!d.
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illegal drugs. 43 "Only the superintendent, principals, viceprincipals, and athletic directors ha[ d] access to test results." 44
Students who failed were immediately tested again. Upon a
second failed test, the students received the option to either
participate in "an assistance program that includes weekly
urinalysis," or face suspension from "the current season and
the next athletic season." 45 The policy specifically targeted
athletes who played sports "where the risk of immediate
physical harm to the drug user or those with whom he is
playing his sport is particularly high." 46 The stated purpose of
the policy was to de-glamorize drug use. 47
James Acton, a seventh-grade football player, and his
parents, refused to sign the testing consent forms. 48 The school
subsequently denied him participation on the school football
team. 49 The Acton family requested declaratory and injunctive
relief from enforcement of the policy, arguing it violated the
United States Constitution and the Oregon Constitution. 50
Since a urine drug test administered by a public school is a
search of a student by a state official, students have Fourth
Amendment protections; these protections are tempered,
however by the student's unique standing as a child enrolled in
a public school. 5 1 The ultimate measure of constitutionality of a
governmental search is "reasonableness;" to determine
reasonableness, the Court balanced the intrusion on the
student's Fourth Amendment interests against the legitimate
governmental interests promoted by the random drug test. 52 In
determining "reasonableness," the Court realized that it could
not "disregard the schools' custodial and tutelary responsibility
for children." 53
43. !d.
44. !d. at 651.
45. !d.
46. !d. at 662.
4 7. !d. at 650 (stating that one of the purposes of the policy was "to prevent
student athletes from using drugs").
48. !d. at 651.
49. !d.
50. !d. at 651-52.
51. /d.at 652, 654 ("Central, in our view, to the present case is the fact that the
subjects of the Policy are (1) children, who (2) have been committed to the temporary
custody of the State as schoolmaster.").
52. !d. at 652-53.
53. !d. at 656 (Recognizing the importance of considering the search in light of the
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While engaged in balancing the student-athlete's
expectation of privacy with the school's legitimate interest in
drug testing, the Court analyzed the unique position of
student-athletes. Due to factors like "suiting up" before
practices and communal locker rooms, student-athletes enjoy
less privacy interests than other students. 54 The Court also
found the fact that students who participate in athletics
"voluntarily subject themselves to a degree of regulation even
higher than that imposed on students generally highly
instructive." 55
One issue of potential privacy troubled the Court to some
degree, but not enough to change the outcome. The Court noted
that students were required to identify in advance any
medications they were taking, otherwise risking a false positive
test. 56 While this requirement made the test more intrusive,
the Court found that the limited personnel with access to the
information made the policy not such an invasion of privacy as
to invalidate the entire scheme. 57
The Court determined that the school district had an
interest "important enough to justify" the drug testing policy in
light of the level of privacy interest of the student-athletes. 58 In
considering the nature of the school district's interest, the
Court stated, "Deterring drug use by our Nation's
schoolchildren is at least as important as enhancing efficient
enforcement of the Nation's laws against the importation of
drugs." 59 The Court also reasoned that the "physical,
psychological, and addictive effects of drugs are most severe"
during school years. 60 The opinion recognized and approved of
the narrow tailoring of this drug testing program, finding it
was directed at deterring drug use by student-athletes "where

school environment and unique role of the public school, the court cited N.J. v. T.L.O.,
469 U.S. at 339, "[A] proper educational environment requires close supervision of
schoolchildren, as well as the enforcement of rules against conduct that would be
perfectly permissible if undertaken by an adult."). Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 655.
54. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 657.
55. Id. (noting that in Vernonia, like in many districts, students participating in
athletics have to submit to preseason physical exams).
56. Id. at 659.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 661.
59. Id.
60. Id.
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the risk of immediate physical harm to the drug user or those
with whom he is playing his sport is particularly high." 61
The drug problem in Vernonia was of special importance to
the Court, which called it an "immediate crisis" and reasoned
that it was "self-evident that a drug problem largely fueled by
the 'role model' effect of athletes' drug use . . . is effectively
addressed by making sure that athletes do not use drugs." 62
While the student's parents in this case argued for a less
intrusive method, such as "testing on suspicion of use" only, 63
the Court noted: "We have repeatedly refused to declare that
only the 'least intrusive' search practicable can be reasonable
under the Fourth Amendment." 64 Thus, in light of the
students' "decreased expectation of privacy, the relative
unobtrusiveness of the search," and the legitimate interests
shown by the school district, the random drug testing policy
was reasonable and constitutional. 65
Vernonia was not, however, a unanimous decision by the
Supreme Court. While Justice Ginsburg joined the opinion, she
also wrote her own short concurrence. 66 Justice Ginsburg noted
a relationship between the students being tested-those who
voluntarily participate in extracurricular athletics-and the
most severe punishment-suspension from extracurricular
athletics. 67 Justice Ginsburg also used her concurrence to
clarify her understanding that the majority opinion reserved
the question of whether districts could perform mandatory
testing on all students for another day.
Justice O'Connor penned the dissent, joined by Justices
Stevens and Souter. 68 She dissented because the Court's
decision did not require individualized suspicion, and she felt
the majority failed to adequately explain why individualized
suspicion was unnecessary in the context of student-athlete

61. Id. at 662.
62. Id. at 663.
63. Id. at 665 (noting that the majority of Vernonia parents overwhelmingly
supported the plan, and that the record showed no objection to the program by any
other parents other than the Acton family).
64. Id. at 663.
65. Id. at 664-65.
66. ld. at 666.
67. Id.
68. ld.
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testing. 69 In summary, Justice O'Connor argued that because
the school district already had in place a discipline system
based on individualized suspicion/ 0 and the district had "firstor second-hand stories of particular, identifiable students
acting in ways that plainly gave rise to reasonable suspicion of
in-school drug use," the district could easily impose a suspicionbased drug testing program that would not intrude on any
student's Fourth Amendment rights.7 1
Ill. VERNONIA SCHOOL DISTRICT 47J V. ACTON: THE FINAL
WORD IN SCHOOL DRUG TESTING? I THINK NOT. A LOOK AT THE
CASES THAT HAVE FURTHER DEFINED THE LIMITS OF DRUG
TESTING IN SCHOOLS
Following Vernonia, litigation regarding random drug
testing in schools has continued at all levels. 72 Student and
parent plaintiffs have argued that state constitutions provide
greater protections than the Federal Constitution, and that
schools lack the "special need" to invade student privacy. As
demonstrated in this section, when balancing student privacy
rights and school interests in maintaining healthy and safe
environments, state and federal courts have not arrived at
consistent decisions regarding these issues.

A. The United States Supreme Court Overturns a Tenth Circuit
Holding that Drug Testing Violates Student's Fourth
Amendment Rights
In June 2002, the United States Supreme Court held as
constitutional a policy requiring drug testing of all students
participating in extracurricular activities at the middle school
and high school levels. 73 Initially, a federal district court held
that while the school district did not demonstrate that the drug
69. !d. at 668-86. Justice O'Conner notes specifically in her dissent that "[o]ne
searches today's majority opinion in vain for recognition that history and precedent
establish that individualized suspicion is 'usually required' under the Fourth
Amendment ... ."Id. at 676.
70. Id. at 677-79.
71. !d. at 679.
72. Since Vernonia, there have been decisions at all levels regarding drug testing
in schools: the U.S. Supreme Court, U.S. Court of Appeals, and State Supreme Courts.
73. Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie County v. Earls, 536
U.S. 822, 825 (2002).

-
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problem had reached epidemic levels, "special needs" existed in
the public school setting that supported the policy.74 The Tenth
Circuit reversed the decision, reasoning that the school district
failed to show an identifiable drug abuse problem among a
sufficient number of the extracurricular students to justify
testing as a remedial measure. 75
In the fall of 1998, a school district in Tecumseh, Oklahoma
adopted a Student Activities Drug Testing Policy.7 6 The policy
required all middle and high school students to consent to
urinalysis testing for drugs before participating in any
extracurricular activity. 77 Students were also required to
permit random drug testing while participating in that
activity. 78 Additionally, to the policy required students to agree
to be tested at any time upon "reasonable suspicion." 79 The
drug testing was designed to detect only the use of illegal
drugs, not medical conditions or authorized prescription
medications. 80 Students and their parents sued the district,
claiming that the policy violated the Fourth Amendment. 81 The
Supreme
Court
reviewed
the
district's
policy
for
"reasonableness." 82 The Court noted that it had previously held
that '"special needs' inhere in the public school context,"
lessening the burden the government must show in justifying a

74. Earls v. Bd. ofEduc. ofTecumseh Pub. Sch. Dist., 115 F. Supp. 2d 1281, 128687 (2000), reu'd, 242 F.3d 1264 (lOth Cir. 2001), reu'd, 536 U.S. 822 (2002) (holding that
there was a history of drug abuse starting in 1970 presenting a legitimate cause for
concern).
75. Earls v. Bd. of Educ. of Tecumseh Pub. Sch. Dist., 242 F.3d 1264, 1270 (2001),
reu'd, 536 U.S. 822 (2002) (holding that the School District failed to demonstrate a
sufficient drug problem among students participating in extracurricular activities to
justify the policy).
76. Earls v. Bd. of Educ. of Tecumseh Pub. Sch. Dist., 536 U.S. at 826.
77. Id. In practice, however, the policy was only applied to students' participation
in competitive extracurricular activities sanctioned by the Oklahoma Secondary
Schools Activities Association.
78. ld.
79. ld.
80. ld.
81. ld. at 826-27.
82. Id. at 828. Normally, the Court determines reasonableness by balancing the
nature of the intrusion on the individual's privacy against the promotion of a legitimate
governmental interest, but, in the context of safety, a search may be reasonable when
"special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and
probable-cause requirement impracticable." ld. at 829 (quoting Griffin v. Wisconsin,
483 u.s 868 (1987)).
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search of students. 83 The first factor the Court considered was
"the nature of the privacy interest" of the students, balanced
against the school's interest in maintaining the discipline,
health, and safety of students. The Court concluded that the
students affected by this policy had a limited expectation of
privacy because students who voluntarily participate in school
extracurricular activities have reason to expect intrusions upon
their rights and privileges. 84
As a second factor, the Court analyzed the "character of the
intrusion imposed by the Policy," requiring a fact-specific
inquiry into "the manner in which production of the urine
sample is monitored." 85 The Court found that the policy was
"minimally intrusive" and limited in its uses, concluding "that
the invasion of the students' privacy [was] not significant." 86
Finally, as a third factor, the Court addressed the "nature and
immediacy" of the district's concerns and the "efficacy of the
Policy in meeting [those concerns]." 87 The Court held that
testing of "students who participate in extracurricular
activities is a reasonably effective means of addressing the
school district's legitimate concerns in preventing, deterring,
and detecting drug use." For these reasons, the policy satisfied
this third and final prong. 88

B. The Seventh Circuit Upholds Suspicionless Drug Testing for
Students Participating in Extracurricular Activities and
Student Drivers
In 2000, the Seventh Circuit Court affirmed an Indiana
District Court decision that students participating in
extracurricular activities or driving to school may be subject to
random, suspicionless drug and alcohol testing. Five students
initially brought suit alleging that the drug testing policy
83. Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottowatomie County v. Earls, 536
U.S. 822, 829 (2002).
84. ld. at 830-32.
85. ld. at 832.
86. Id. at 833-34 (describing protocol where the monitor waits outside the
restroom stall listening for urination sounds, the results are kept confidential and
separate from other educational records, results are not turned over to law
enforcement, and the only consequence of a failed test is limiting the student's
privilege of participating in extracurricular activities).
87. ld. at 834.
88. ld. at 837.
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passed by the Penn-Harris-Madison School Corporation in 1998
violated their Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable
search and seizure. 89 The Indiana District Court held that the
policy was constitutional. 90 The Seventh Circuit determined
that it was bound by the principle of stare decisis to follow its
1997 ruling in Todd u. Rush County Schools upholding a
similar policy_9 1 Following this decision, the court ruled this
policy was constitutional as well.
In 1998, Penn-Harris-Madison instituted a drug testing
policy for its students.9 2 The policy focused on five groups of
students, including: student drivers, students who participate
in extracurricular activities, students who volunteer to be
tested, students who have been suspended for three or more
consecutive days, and students for which there is a reasonable
suspicion.9 3 To justify the implementation of its policy, PennHarris-Madison relied on Todd.9 4 In Todd, the district
demonstrated that drug use was a problem on the rise on the
rise within the district. 95 The disputed policy in Todd tested
students in extracurricular activities because they act as role
models and because of serious health risks associated with
drug use. 96 Unlike the school district in Todd, however, PennHarris-Madison did not show evidence of a pervasive drug
problem or prove any correlation between drug use and student
involvement in extracurricular activities. 97
The Seventh Circuit applied Todd and noted that PennHarris-Madison failed to show a "special need" justifying the
testing of students.9 8 Nevertheless, the court determined it was
bound by principles of stare decisis to follow its ruling in Todd
upholding a similar policy. 99 The court ruled the Penn-Harris89. Joy v. Penn-Harris-Madison Sch. Corp., 212 F.3d 1052 (7th Cir. 2000).
90. ld. at 1054.
91. Todd v. Rush County Sch., 139 F.3d 571 (7th Cir. 1998) (The court in Todd
relied on Vernonia, the court held that the school district established a "special need"
justifying the intrusiveness of the drug policy).
92. Joy, 212 F.3d at 1053-54.
93. ld. at 1055.
94. ld. at 1062.
95. ld. at 1061.
96. ld.
97. ld. at 1066 (Penn-Harris-Madison admitted that the ultimate goal was to
prevent drug use by testing all students on a random suspicionless basis).
98. ld. at 1067.
99. ld. at 1066.
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Madison policy also constitutional. 100 The court did not,
however, explain its ruling in Todd, and acknowledged no
factual differences between the two cases.

C. The Indiana Supreme Court Reverses the Court of Appeals
and holds a Drug Testing Policy Constitutional under the
Indiana State Constitution
In 2002, the Indiana Supreme Court reversed a court of
appeals decision in Linhc u. Northwestern School Corp., and
reinstated the decision of the trial court upholding a random
drug testing policy. 101 The trial court originally upheld the
policy, ruling that the drug testing policy was reasonable. 102
The Indiana Court of Appeals reversed this decision, holding
that because the state constitution provides greater protection
against unwarranted drug testing than the Federal Fourth
Amendment, drug testing students without individualized
suspicion violated the Indiana Constitution. 103 On petition to
transfer, the Indiana Supreme Court reversed the decision
back to the original district court holding. 104
In Linke, the Northwestern School Corporation (NSC)
instituted a drug testing policy in January 1999. The random
urinalysis testing policy was designed to protect the health and
safety of the students, and to improve the image of NSC in the
community. The drug testing policy resulted from a task force
designed to examine the district's approach to drugs in the
school. 105 The drug testing policy applied to all middle school
and high school students participating in school athletics,
specified extracurricular and co-curricular activities, as well as
student drivers who parked on campus. 106 A computer selected
students to be tested and students received no advance

100. !d. at 1067.
101. Linke v. Nw. Sch. Corp., 763 N.E.2d 972 (Ind. 2002).
102. Id. at 976-77.
103. Linke v. Nw. Sch. Corp., 734 N.E.2d 252 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) rev'd, 763
N.E.2d 972 (Ind. 2002).
104. !d.
105. Linke, 763 N.E.2d at 975. In 1998-1999, two suspensions and two expulsions
at high school, five suspensions and five expulsions at the middle school, and a 1996
death by drug overdose by a student who bought drugs at school from a fellow student.
106. !d. Students who did not want to be tested would have to skip public
performances in their co/extracurricular activities, but could complete alternative
assignments for credit.
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warning; they were then taken to a separate trailer, one at a
time, and were able to complete the test alone. 107 The specimen
was tested only for substances banned by the district. 108
In upholding the policy, the Indiana Supreme Court
considered the policy under both the Federal Fourth
Amendment and the Indiana Constitution. The lower court had
relied on a prior case requiring "individualized suspicion"
before a police officer could stop a motorist for a seatbelt
violation. 109 Despite this precedent, the Indiana Supreme
Court distinguished a search conducted to enforce the law from
one conducted by a school, noting the different roles played by
law enforcement and teachers. 110 The court also noted that the
results of the drug tests were not volunteered to law
enforcement and not used for internal disciplinary functions. 111
The court found that "balancing the students' interests against
the school corporation's [interests], better comport[ed] with [a]
totality of circumstances framework than with a per se
requirement of individualized suspicion." 112
In evaluating this policy, the court found persuasive the
lessened student privacy interests, school custodial and
protective interests in their students, and the fact that the
policy was created with parent involvement as an element of a
comprehensive interdiction program. 113 The higher than
average rate of drug use at these schools, the drug related
death, and the continued presence of drugs also strongly
influenced the court's decision. 114 Thus, in light of the totality
of the circumstances, the court stated that the policy did not
violate the Fourth Amendment or the Indiana Constitution. 115

107.
108.
109.
llO.
lll.
112.
ll3.
114.
ll5.

Linke, 734 N.E.2d at 254.
Id.
Baldwin v. Reagan, 715 N.E.2d 332, 337 (Ind. 1999).
Linke, 763 N.E.2d at 978.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 985.
Id.
Id.
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D. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court holds Drug Testing of
Students in Extracurricular Activities and Student Drivers as
Violating the Pennsylvania Constitution
In 2003, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court struck down a
Delaware Valley School District's random, suspicionless drug
testing policy. 116 The policy tested not only student-athletes,
but also students participating in any extracurricular activity
and students applying for parking permits. 117 In 1999, parents
brought suit alleging the policy violated the students' state
constitutional right against search and seizure, and the
parents' fundamental right to make health care decisions for
their children. 118 The trial court ruled that since comparable
intrusions were upheld by Pennsylvania courts in the past, the
students' claim failed as a matter of law. 119 The court also
rejected the parental rights claim. 120 The state appellate court
affirmed the dismissal of the parental rights claim, but vacated
and remanded the claim brought on behalf of the students'
rights against search and seizure. 121 After cross-petition for
allocator, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court considered the
case. 122 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court struck down the
policy and considered the parental claim moot because no
parental rights had been impacted in the facts of the case. 123
In 1998, the Delaware Valley School District adopted a
drug-testing policy which authorized random, suspicionless
drug and alcohol testing of students who held parking permits
or participated in voluntary extracurricular activities. 124
Students or parents of students participating in extracurricular
activities or applying for parking permits had to sign a contract

116. Theodore v. Del. Valley Sch. Dist., 836 A.2d 76 (Pa. 2003) In striking down the
policy, the court articulated its reasoning, stating that students were forced to "Choose
one: your Pennsylvania constitutional right to privacy or the chess club." ld. at 95.
117. ld. at 78.
118. Id. at 80.
119. Id. at 82.
120. Id.
121. Theodore v. Del. Valley Sch. Dist., 761 A.2d 652 (Pa. Commw. 2000) (en bane),
aff'd, 836 A.2d 76 (Pa. 2003).
122. Theodore v. Del. Valley Sch. Dist., 836 A.2d 78 (Pa. 2003). The State Supreme
Court delayed ruling on the case until the United States Supreme Court resolved the
Earls case.
123. ld. at 96.
124. Id. at 78.
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consenting to testing for alcohol and controlled substances. 125
The one-year contract authorized school officials to collect
breath, urine, and blood samples from students, which could
only be used to test for a specific list of drugs. The policy
required testing in five different circumstances: (1) initial
testing, (2) random testing, (3) reasonable suspicion testing, (4)
return-to-activity testing, and (5) follow-up testing. 126
In rejecting the policy, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
considered both the Supreme Court precedent under a Fourth
Amendment analysis, and state specific analysis under article
I, section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. 127 The
Pennsylvania Court had previously held that challenges to
article I, section 8 mandated "greater scrutiny in the school
environment" and the appropriate test was a four-factor test.
The test evaluated the students' privacy interests, the nature
of the intrusion, notice, and the overall purpose to be achieved,
including the immediate reasons prompting the decision to
conduct the search. 128 The court reviewed the first three factors
and did not find any of them determinative, and instead based
its decision, on the fourth factor. 129 Here, the court found that
the district failed to prove that a drug problem actually existed,
or that the means chosen to address the problem would
actually tend to address it. 130 Despite striking down the policy,
the court, in dicta, left open the potential that had the policy
been confined to student-athletes and student drivers, it would
have been upheld. 131

125. !d.
126. Id. at 79.
127. Id. at 88. Article I, section 8 states "[t]he people shall be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and possessions from unreasonable searches and seizures, and
no warrant to search any place or to seize any person of things shall issue without
describing them as nearly as may be, nor without probable cause, supported by oath or
affirmation subscribed to by the affiant." PA. CONST. ART. I, § 8.
128. 836 A.2d at 88.
129. !d. at 90-91.
130. ld. This is "in stark contrast to Vernonia," where the Supreme Court viewed
the drug testing as a last-ditch effort to address a pervasive and disruptive drug
culture where other methods had failed.
131. Id. at 92 ("In addition, while the policy targeted some students who were involved
in activities where drug or alcohol use presents an inherent danger (e.g. student-athletes and
drivers), it included others involved in activities where no such inherent physical danger
exists (e.g. other extracurricular programs ... such as the National Honor Society) ... Were
the suspicionless drug and alcohol testing in this case confined to student-athletes and
students with driving/parking privileges, the question would obviously be closer.").
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E. The Washington Supreme Court holds Random,
Suspicionless Drug Testing of Student-Athletes Violates the
Washington Constitution
In 2008, the Washington Supreme Court, en bane, held that
a random, suspicionless drug testing policy, testing studentathletes, violated article I, section 7 of the Washington State
Constitution. 132 Parents of high school student-athletes, who
had consented to the testing, filed suit against the school
district. 133 The trial court held that drug testing, despite the
lack of any individualized suspicion, was constitutional. 134 The
Washington Supreme Court accepted direct review, and held
that there is no "special needs" exception to the warrant
requirement that would allow random, suspicionless drug
testing.
For this reason,
the
district
policy
was
unconstitutional. 135
As a result of drug and alcohol use in the school community,
the school district implemented random drug testing, requiring
testing of student-athletes at the beginning of the sport season,
and then subjected students to random drug testing during the
remainder of the season. 136 Students were tested by urinalysis,
and the sample was mailed to an independent lab. 137 If a
student tested positive for illegal drugs, the student was
suspended from extracurricular activities. 138 The results were
not sent to law enforcement or made part of the academic
record. 139 After the students in this case consented to the
testing, and were tested, their parents filed suit. 140

132. York v. Wahkiakum Sch. Dist. No. 200, 178 P.3d 995 (2008). Article I, section
7 of the Washington State Constitution states, "No person shall be disturbed in his
private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of law." WASH. CONST. art I, § 7.
133. York, 178 P.3d at 997.
134. !d. at 999 (holding "that while that school district's policy 'approached the
tolerance limit' of our constitution, the policy was, nevertheless, constitutional and
narrowly tailored to reach a compelling government end.").
135. !d. at 997.
136. !d. at 998 (undisputed facts from the trial show that in 2000, 50'% of studentathletes self-identified as drug and/or alcohol users).
137. !d.
138. Id. (the length of suspension depended on the number of infractions and
whether the student tested positive for drugs or for alcohol).
139. !d.
140. !d.
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The Washington Supreme Court expressed substantial
deference to the school district, stating that it "loath[es] to
disturb the decisions of local school board," but ultimately
observed that it "will not hesitate to intervene when
constitutional protections are implicated." 141 Initially, the
Washington Supreme Court distinguished the federal analysis
under the Fourth Amendment from its own analysis under the
Washington State Constitution that affords greater protection
than the U.S. Constitution. 142 The test for determining the
constitutionality of a search under the Washington
Constitution has two prongs; first, the court considers if a
privacy interest is implicated, and then determines if the
intrusion is satisfied by a valid warrant or meets one of the few
exceptions. 143 The court in the case at hand held that because a
"student athlete has a genuine and fundamental privacy
interest in controlling his or her own bodily functions" the first
prong was satisfied, thus forcing the court to consider the
second prong. 144 The court found that unlike the "special
needs" exception used to permit suspicionless searches in
federal cases, Washington had a more limited group of
exceptions including "exigent circumstances, consent, searches
incident to a valid arrest, inventory searches, the plain view
doctrine, and Terry investigate stops." 145
In rejecting the Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment
analysis and its "special need exception" in the school setting,
the Washington court went so far as to say, "If we were to allow
random drug testing here, what prevents school districts from
either later drug testing students participating in any
extracurricular activities, as federal courts now allow, or
testing the entire student population?" 146

141. Id. at 999.
142. Id. at 1000-01 ("[S]imply passing muster under the federal constitution does
not ensure the survival of the school district"s policy under our state constitution.").
143. Id. at 1001.
144. ld. at 1001-02.
145. Id. at 1003 (Washington has a long judicial history of striking down
suspicionless searches, and found no exception applied here.).
146. Id. at 1006.
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IV. DRUG TESTING BY SCHOOL DISTRICTS: CONSTITUTIONAL
CONCERNS AND CONSIDERATIONS

Analysis of school drug testing programs varies by state.
Vernonia and Earls have made it clear that a properly designed
random drug testing program of student-athletes will pass
Fourth Amendment challenges. Despite the strong precedent of
Vernonia and Earls, nonetheless, not all random drug testing
programs will survive state constitutional challenges. Because
each state has unique constitutional protection, programs that
pass federal constitutional muster are possibly impermissible
under stricter state constitutional requirements.
Vernonia introduced the requirement of "special need," and
subsequently, some courts struggled with what "special need"
the district must demonstrate to justify testing student
athletes. 147 Earls broadened the concept of "special need,"
making it clear that under the Fourth Amendment, schools
need not wait until they have evidence of a drug "epidemic" in
order to institute a random drug policy under the Federal
Constitution. 148 Notwithstanding Earls' broadening of the
concept of "special need," some state courts still require a
showing of some
specialized need before permitting a random, suspicionless
drug test of student-athletes under the state constitution. 149
While states evaluate testing programs under their own
constitutions differently than the Supreme Court evaluates
programs under the Federal Constitution, review of Supreme
Court analysis is helpful. Lower courts often turn to standards
articulated by the Supreme Court in a series of Fourth
Amendment cases. These criteria to be considered when
evaluating drug testing programs in schools include: the
rationale behind the policy and whether the policy is tailored in
a way to meet that rationale; 150 which substances are tested
147. Ralph Mawdsley, Random Drug Testing for Extracurricular Activities: Has
the Supreme Court Opened Pandora's Box for Public Schools?, 2003 B.Y.U. Eouc. &
L.J. 587, 607.
148. Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie County v. Earls, 536
U.S. 822, 835 (2002) (evidence of the drug problem in Earls was slight, when compared
with the extreme epidemic present in Vernonia).
149. Mawdsley, supra note 147, at 620.
150. Bjorklun, supra note 6, at 920 (citing Acton v. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J, 796 F.
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and how students inform the district of prescription medication
they are taking; 151 the intrusiveness of actual testing
procedure; 152 and finally, the punishment administered upon a
failed drug test. 153
A. Analysis of School District Random Drug Testing Policies in
Light of the Fourth Amendment

In determining whether random drug testing programs of
student-athletes are legal, courts have used criteria drawn
from several Supreme Court decisions. While reasonableness is
the touchstone of constitutionality of a governmental search,
the Supreme Court has used an extended list of criteria when
considering random urinalysis drug testing of students. Due to
its scope, this paper will only consider a few key criteria
considered in a court's analysis of random, suspicionless drug
testing programs.

1. The nature of the school district's interest and the district's
compelling need for testing
School districts carry a burden of demonstrating the need
for testing within their district. Even when the test results
show drug use percentages comparable to the national average,
schools may still have a compelling need in light of the impact
of drug use on athletes. 154 In Schaill v. Tippecanoe County, 31%
of the baseball team tested positive for drug use, a percentage
roughly comparable to the use by the public as a whole. 155
However, the school argued that it had a compelling need for
drug testing and presented evidence that drugs alter mood,
motor coordination, and one's pain perception, thus supporting
the school's claim that the health and safety of athletes and
cheerleaders is a concern closely associated with drug use. 156

Supp. 1354, 1363 (Dist. Or. 1992), rev'd, 23 F.3d 1514 (9th Cir. 1994), vacated, 515 U.S.
646 (1995)).
151. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 659 (1995).
152. Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie County v. Earls, 536
U.S. 822, 832 (2002).
15.'3. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 664 (1995).
154. Bjorklun, supra note 6, at 918.
155. Schaill v. Tippecanoe County, 864 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir. 1988).
156. !d. at 1320.
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While it appears easy for a district to design a compelling
need, in Brooks, the court found no compelling need. 157 There,
the court stated that the district could justify the urinalysis
program if it provided evidence that participants in
extracurricular activities were more likely to use drugs than
non-partiCipants, or that drug use interfered with the
educational mission more if those students were using. 158 The
court stated, "The justification for the ... drug testing program
in essence is that their students would be safer in everything
they did if they did not use drugs or alcohol. That rationale
does not meet the compelling need criteria necessary to
undertake a search without reasonable suspicion." 159

2. Limiting the scope of the drug testing program, and tailoring
it to achieve the stated goals
Courts consider whether programs are limited in scope and
tailored to achieve their stated goals. They appear to generally
"uphold drug testing programs limited in scope and designed to
achieve specific goals as opposed to general efforts to test large
numbers of students in the hope that such massive testing will
deter students from drug use generally." 160 Another factor that
may come into play in future challenges is the actual impact.
For example, if a policy is designed to deter drug use among
that student population-as opposed to decreased injuries
among athletes caused by drug abuse- and drug use is
climbing, students may have a good argument that the
program, as designed, is not tailored to achieve its goals. 161
In Brooks, the court held a policy that tested over half of the
student body during the first half of the school year, and
potentially all but thirteen students who ultimately would have
been tested if the program had been permitted to continue, 162

157. Brooks v. E. Chambers Consol. lndep. Sch. Dist., 730 F. Supp. 759, 761 (8.
Dist. Tex 1989), aff'd, 930 F.2d 915 (5th Cir. 1991).
158. Id. at 764.
159. Id. at 764-65.
160. Bjorklun supra note 6, at 920.
161. Policies vary in goals, from deterrence of general drug use, to preventing
impaired students from participating, to decreasing problematic behavior at school
caused by drug use.
162. Brooks. 730 F. Supp. at 765. Only thirteen students did not participate in
some sort of extracurricular activity. Id. at 761.
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was highly intrusive and unlikely to achieve its stated goals. 163
In contrast, the court in Schaill held that a drug testing policy
that only tested participants in athletics was sufficiently
limited in scope. The Schaill court also found the policy was
designed to enforce its goals regarding the safety and health of
participants. 164 In Acton, the court compared the policy with
that in Brooks and found that "[u]nlike the policy ... in Brooks,
which applied random drug testing to all extra-curricular
activities, the Vernonia policy is limited ... "to athletics. 165 This
correlated with the purpose of the policy, addressing student
safety in athletic programs. From this analysis, it appears that
courts will uphold testing programs limited in scope, but reject
those that are "fishing expedition[s]" designed to identify "drug
and alcohol use to carry on a moral crusade." 166

3. The diminished expectation of privacy of a student-athlete
Generally, urinalysis testing is considered more than
"minimally intrusive." In fact, the United States Supreme
Court stated that the "excretory function is traditionally
shielded by great privacy" and there are few activities in life
more personal or private. 167 Despite this precedent, in
Vernonia, the Supreme Court determined that random
urinalysis testing may be a negligible privacy invasion
depending on the manner in which the sample is collected. 168
This holding in Vernonia-that drug tests of students usmg
urinalysis was minimally invasive-conflicts with their
previous holding that urinalysis of adults is invasive. 169
When this "minimal intrusion" is paired with a student's
diminished expectation of privacy, drug tests in schools are
permitted. In Vernonia, the Court noted that because students
are "routinely required to submit to various physical
examinations and to be vaccinated against various diseases,"
163. !d. at 765. One of the stated goals was to prevent impaired students from
taking part in after school activities.
164. Schaill v. Tippecanoe County Sch. Corp., 864 F.2d 1309, 1320 (7th Cir. 1988).
165. Acton v. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J, 796 F. Supp. 1354, 1363 (Dist. Or. 1992),
rev'd, 23 F.3d 1514 (9th Cir. 1994), vacated, 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
166. Bjorklun, supra note 6, at 920 (citing Vernonia, 796 F.Supp. at 1363).
167. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 604 (1989).
168. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 4 7J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 657-58 (1995).
169. This is likely related to the concept that students, while in school, have more
relaxed constitutional rights than the normal citizen.
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students cannot reasonably expect normal Fourth Amendment
protections from invasions like urinalysis testing. 170 Studentathletes have even fewer privacy expectations, since they
voluntarily choose to participate in school sports and subject
themselves to physical exams and additional regulations. 171
The Court also found it significant that drug tests were kept
confidential, did not become part of a student's academic
record, were not turned over to law enforcement, and were
destroyed after a short period of time. 172
Critics of drug testing in schools highlight that a similar
testing of adults would be unconstitutional. Additionally,
testing only students in sports, presuming their guilt and that
they are more likely to use to drugs, is unfair. 173 One critic
noted that students are faced with a catch-22 of sorts, because
"[i]nvolvement in sports is sometimes an important way for
students to counteract the negative influences that may
surround them .... [t]herefore, it is unfair to compel students
to choose between athletics on one hand and all vestiges of
privacy on the other." 174

4. The character of the intrusion; are there less intrusive
alternatives?
Courts may also consider whether school districts have
tried less intrusive methods to discourage drug use; however,
the Supreme Court has upheld instances of random
suspicionless drug testing even though less restrictive
alternatives were available. 175 In Acton, the district had tried
several educational programs designed to discourage drug use,
but "the 'subtle' approach not only failed, but seemed to cause
further disruptions." 176 In Acton, the court concluded that
"random drug urinalysis testing was ... the next logical step in

170. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 656.
171. Id. at 657.
172. Sysol, supra note 7, at 600.
173. Darrel Jackson, The Constitution Expelled: What Remains of Students' Fourth
Amendment Rights? 28 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 673 (Summer 1996).
174. ld. at 673, 685-86.
175. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 663.
176. Acton v. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J, 796 F. Supp. 1354, 1363 (Dist. Or. 1992),
rev'd, 23 F.3d 1514 (9th Cir. 1994), vacated, 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
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a progressive attempt to address the drug and alcohol
problems." 177
Critics of drug testing policies have argued for suspiciOnbased testing. Some fear exists that suspicion-based testing
may impair relationships between teachers and students, as
well as students and other students, because testing relies on
someone "tattling" on another. One critic of current drug
testing policies argues that a suspicion-based system will not
create adversarial relationships because "where drug impaired
students are concerned, those relationships are already
adversarial." 178
In addition to considering alternatives, courts have also
considered the method of collecting the test sample itself when
determining the reasonableness of the policy. In Earls, the
court noted that the student was alone during the testing,
while the faculty member listened outside the stall for the
"normal sounds of urination." 179

5. Policy limitations on school district officials' discretion
An article outlining case law and drug testing policies
highlighted the discretion of school officials as a key factor in
evaluating the constitutionality of the random drug testing
policy. 180 Intuitively, it would seem that the less discretion
school officials have, the more likely the policy is to stand as
constitutional. When students are not picked at random using
a computer or similar method, there may be a presumption
that the test was in bad faith. To survive court scrutiny, it is
important to outline and follow testing procedures to ensure
"that any particular search was not motivated by a desire to
harass or intimidate." 181

6. The penalties for failed drug test, criminal or otherwise
In all the policies reviewed and upheld by the various
courts, the penalties for a failed drug test were related why

177. Vernonia, 796 F. Supp. at 1364.
178. Jackson, supra note 173, at 693.
179. Bd. of Educ. of lndep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie County v. Earls, 536
U.S. 822, 831 (2002).
180. BjorkJun, supra note 6, at 922.
181. Id. at 921.
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reason students were tested in the first place. For example, in
Vernonia, students were suspended from the current season,
and potentially also from the next season. 182 None of the
policies appear to involve punishment more severe than
suspension from extracurricular activities. Students were
never suspended from school, nor law enforcement ever
notified. One can assume that if the penalty involved criminal
action, or a permanent mark on a student's academic record,
courts might require that the drug testing be based on
individualized suspicion. 183

B. The Future of Drug Testing in Schools
As the Washington case York v. Wahkiakum demonstrates,
even if a school district drug testing policy passes federal
constitutional challenges,
there
may still be
state
constitutional bars to the program. 184 Some states are more
welcoming to drug testing policies. New Jersey was the first
state to mandate random steroid testing for high school
student-athletes through statewide legislation. 185 Other states,
like Texas, Florida, and Illinois have either considered or
passed similar legislation. 186

C. Conclusion
Today, controversy in the drug testing arena continues.
Even the federal government has become involved through
administrative policies. 187 At the state level, regulation

182. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646,666 (1995).
183. One critic of drug testing notes that suspicionless drug testing tells students
that they are guilty until proven innocent, and some students "may feel that they are
treated as second-class citizens" because the courts allow suspicionless testing of
students when they would not allow it of adults. Jackson, supra note 173, at 695.
184. York v. Wahkiakum Sch. Dist. No. 200, 178 P.3d 995 (2008).
185. Lawlor, supra note 7.
186. Sysol, supra note 7, at 597~98.
187. Despite questions about the actual effectiveness of random drug testing
policies and the prevalence of drug problems among high school athletes, the Bush
administration was supportive of school drug testing. In fact, the "No Child Left
Behind Act" provides that federal money may be used for school drug testing programs.
For a report on the prevalence of drug use, and effectiveness of random drug testing
policies. See ZEESE, supra note 10, § 8:4. To read more about "No Child Left Behind,"
see 20 U.S.C. §4115. As with many facets of education, the federal government provides
funding and may be able to limit the law that governs. If the funding for the program is
purely federal, courts may be required to apply federal law.
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continues, despite mixed results. In 2009, the Texas University
Interscholastic League released results that they found only
seven positive results in nearly 19,000 tests of high school
athletes for steroid use. 188 A Texas state senator was quoted as
criticizing the drug testing program as a "colossal waste of
taxpayer money." 189 While this particular program was
designed only to identify steroid use, it highlights a familiar
public complaint-if student drug use is the same as the
national average, even among athletes, then the money might
be better spent on other programs. But, as a parent of a
student who committed suicide while battling depression
potentially related to steroid use observed, "They don't stop
testing Olympic athletes just because most of them don't test
positive." 190
Other arguments show that while student-athlete drug use
mirrors the national average, there is a greater abuse of
performance enhancing drugs. 191 Student-athletes do not only
use drugs to enhance their performances, but also use them to
fight fatigue, mask pain, and cope with the increased stress of
being a student-athlete. 192 Also, when compared to the drugs
used by the general student population, drugs used by studentathletes are more harmful and have a greater probability of
reaching epidemic proportions. 193
Drug testing is perhaps not the only remedy available to
school officials in deterring drug use and protecting student
safety, but schools lack an infinite continuum of alternatives. 194
Courts have emphasized that schools should try alternative
policies first, and resort to drug testing as a last resort. At this
point, the case law seems clear that due to the volunteer nature
of high school athletics, the physical nature of sports and the
need for mental sharpness to ensure safety during sporting

188. Jim Vertuno, Few Texas High School Athletes Fail Steroid Test (Feb. 20,
2009), http://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory?id=6923792.
189. !d.
190. !d.
191. Knapp, supra note 9, at 107.
192. /d. at 113.
193. !d. at 107~08.
194. Mawdsley supra note 14 7, at 622.
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competitions, random drug testing of student-athletes by school
districts is permitted.
Sara Young

